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Jurisdiction: The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(a).

Statement of the issue: I established good cause with the Department of
Workforce Services for leaving my place of employment by showing that
staying on would have created sufficient hardship to make it necessary for
me to quit or that I had no reasonable alternative to quitting. Neither the
administrative law judge nor the Workforce Appeals Board addressed that
issue.

Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, and rules:
(Utah Administrative Code R994-405)
To establish good cause, a claimant must show that continuing the
employment would have caused an adverse effect which the claimant could
not control or prevent. The claimant must show that an immediate severance
of the employment relationship was necessary.
(1) Adverse Effect on the Claimant.
(a) Hardship.
The separation must have been motivated by circumstances that made the
continuance of the employment a hardship or matter of concern, sufficiently
adverse to a reasonable person so as to outweigh the benefits of remaining
employed. There must have been actual or potential physical, mental,
economic, personal or professional harm caused or aggravated by the
employment. The claimant's decision to quit must be measured against the
actions of an average individual, not one who is unusually sensitive.
(b) Ability to control or prevent.
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Even though there is evidence of an adverse effect on the claimant, good
cause will not be found if the claimant:
(i)
(ii)

(iii)

reasonably could have continued working while looking for
other employment,
had reasonable alternatives that would have made it possible to
preserve the job like using approved leave, transferring, or
making adjustments to personal circumstances, or,
did not give the employer notice of the circumstances causing
the hardship thereby depriving the employer of an opportunity
to make changes that would eliminate the need to quit. An
employee with grievances must have made a good faith effort to
work out the differences with the employer before quitting
unless those efforts would have been futile.

Statement of the case:
The initial denial of my unemployment claim by the Department of
Workforce Services on May 29, 2008 was based on the caseworker's
perception that I voluntarily left my place of employment and that I did not
establish good cause for leaving by showing that staying on would have
created sufficient hardship to make it necessary for me to quit or that I had
no reasonable alternative to quitting (pg. 19 of record index #08-R-00433).
Based on the findings of fact from the June 26,2008 telephone hearing,
Judge McPeck reversed that decision. She concluded that the employer was
the moving party in my termination and that the employer was also
unreasonable in not allowing me to stay on until I had sufficient time to meet
with my physician (pg. 92 of record index #08-R-00433). I had hoped to
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attempt to remedy the effects of a bone condition which made it extremely
difficult for me to lead the 4-hour blocks of group therapy which had been
assigned within 2 weeks prior to my termination.
A subsequent decision of the Workforce Appeals Board reversed the
decision of Judge McPeck. The board concluded that I was the moving
party in my termination and that the employer was reasonable in refusing to
allow me to remain employed long enough to meet with my physician and to
attempt to remedy my pain and fatigue (pg. 107 of record index #08-R00433).
Regardless of whom the moving party was in the termination of my
employment or of whether or not the employer was reasonable in refusing to
allow me to continue to work until I had met with my physician, one point
still remains unaddressed by both the judge as well as the appeals board.
That is the statement of the Department of Workforce Services' caseworker
that I did not establish good cause for leaving by showing that staying on
would have created sufficient hardship to make it necessary for me to quit or
that I had no reasonable alternative to quitting.
I provided a letter from my primary-care physician for the telephone
hearing with the administrative law judge to the effect that leading the 4hour blocks of group therapy was beyond my physical ability and, therefore,
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an undue hardship in light of my health condition (pg. 24 of record index 08R-00433). Without a reasonable accommodation from the employer or an
opportunity to further address my health needs with my physician, I had no
reasonable alternative but to leave my place of employment. In an April 29th
phone conversation I had with the Deputy Director of the agency I worked
for, I asked if an accommodation could be made in regard to leading the
groups. He informed me it could not. I was also presented with a
termination letter the following day in lieu of being allowed to remain
employed while undergoing health treatments.

Relevant facts, summary, and detail:
The employer has indicated that it is their perception that I was the
moving party in my job termination and that, if I had not been, they would
have had every right to fire me. It seems that I am in a no-win situation in
regard to my unemployment claim within that particular set of parameters.
However, by far the majority of my employer's complaints about my job
performance were waged against me after I had expressed a need for
accommodation at a particular job site in the Bear Lake area.
I had traveled through Logan Canyon to Bear Lake every Friday as part
of my employment with the health department. I very much enjoyed that
aspect of my job. As a matter of fact, it was by far my favorite work
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responsibility, and I had successfully carried it out for about 2 lA months.
However, the location for that job assignment changed from a welltrafficked health clinic to a remote location above a real-estate office around
the beginning of April of 2008. I was told that I would recognize the new
location when I got there due to the "steep flight of stairs" on the outside of
the building by which I would gain access to our office. I was also told to
"throw a couple of chairs in the back of the van" and take them to my new
work location. In addition, I had a heavy television monitor which needed to
be transported to and from the Bear Lake location on a weekly basis.
Having been concerned about my potential inability to carry the heavy office
furnishings, equipment, and supplies up the stairs due to my slight build and
a prior knee injury (pg. 23 of record index 08-R-00433), my husband offered
to take an unpaid day away from his own workplace and to follow me to
Bear Lake in our family car so that he could assist with the lifting and the
climbing. Upon our arrival at the location, it also became apparent that I
was the only one conducting business that day on the upper floor of that
building and that I was to be placed in the somewhat precarious position of
being left alone to provide treatment services for a set of male offenders,
none of whom I felt especially endangered by. However, as noted by Dr.
Wentz, the onsite psychologist at the health department, such a situation
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presented not only a safety issue for myself but also a liability issue for the
agency should any of the clients choose to accuse me of improper conduct as
no one else would be there to affirm otherwise.
In light of those concerns, I chose to speak with Brock Alder, the head of
my department, and Todd Barson, the deputy director at the agency, and to
request the accommodation of having my husband accompany me on a
weekly basis to the Bear Lake location. That would ensure my safety as
well as the propriety of my interactions with my clients. In addition, my
husband could assist with any lifting that was required as well as my ascent
up the stairs if necessary. As a point of information, I would like to indicate
that my husband has worked professionally at a mental-health institution for
3 years in the past in the provision of security services. However, neither
Mr. Alder nor Mr. Barson looked favorably upon my suggested solution to
my concerns about my,new worksite.
The following week, I returned to the Bear Lake area and that time was
accompanied by a clerical person from the agency. While there, I had
occasion to meet the woman who was the head of the home-healthcare office
that was located directly adjacent to our office. I took the opportunity to
inquire as to whether or not she could ensure that someone from her office
would be onsite while I worked there with my clientele. She told me she
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was willing to bring up my inquiry in her next staff meeting and encouraged
me to get back with her. However, upon relaying that information to Mr.
Alder and Mr. Barson, I was told that I had stepped out of bounds in
speaking with the director of the home-healthcare agency and that it had
been determined that a male therapist would take my place in Bear Lake.
I did not, as indicated by both Judge McPeck and the Workforce Appeals
Board, request to be returned to the Beair Lake office after my job
responsibilities had been reassigned. That was a mistaken inference on the
part of the judge, which I failed to correct upon receiving her favorable
judgment regarding my unemployment claim. I assume that what the
employer suggested and what the appeals board inferred as a history of
vacillation on my part was based at least in part on that mistaken inference.
As I have indicated, I tried very had to maintain my work assignment in
Bear Lake.
Part of the reason I tried so hard to keep the Bear Lake assignment was
that I was even more concerned about the new job responsibilities that were
to be assigned to me. I was to conduct a weekly, 4-hour, therapy session
with a quickly transitioning group of substance-abuse clients who had been
court-ordered into our intensive-outpatient-treatment program (IOP). I was
also to fill in approximately monthly for a 4-hour block of group therapy
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sessions at the jail. Having had a previous opportunity to lead the 4-hour
block of IOP while filling in for another therapist who was away on training,
I realized how very fatiguing that assignment would be to me. I was
diagnosed with a bone condition in my left ribcage in September of 2007
and have experienced ongoing pain and fatigue since that time. Leading the
4-hour block of group therapy required a great deal of physical and mental
energy to keep the group on task and moving in the right direction. I even
had to play referee with a couple of male clients who seemed to be vying
with one another for a leadership position in the group. I am afraid I
realized at the time I substituted for the other therapist that I didn't have the
stamina to run the 4-hour group without a co-leader as I was relatively
nonfunctional at home for several days thereafter. I leaned a great deal upon
my husband for cleaning, shopping, and meal preparation at that time.
While I did accept the new assignments (4-hour blocks of group therapy)
and carried them out for a couple of weeks, my prior suspicion that they
would be too much for me was confirmed, and I called to speak with Mr.
Barson about that on the morning of April 29th. It was not my intention to
terminate my employment at that time but merely to request an
accommodation. I had just spoken with an adjudicator at the Department of
Workforce Services (most likely a man by the name of Kyle) about the
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benefits of requesting an accommodation versus quitting. Mr. Barson
indicated that no accommodation could be made on my behalf, especially in
light of the fact that an accommodation had already been made in regard to
the Bear Lake assignment, and encouraged me to accept a termination date
at the end of the week, a date which he, himself, verbalized. I was a bit
shocked and disappointed at Mr. Barson's suggestion. I did not even have
an opportunity to brainstorm with him some possible accommodations that
may have worked to meet my needs as well as those of the agency.
The appeals board suggested that I was not diagnosed with my bone
condition until May, a month after my separation from the health
department, but that I should have had plenty of time to correct my condition
before leaving my place of employment at the end of April (pgs. 106 and
107 of record index #08-R-00433). Therein is an apparent contradiction in
the suggested timing of the appeals board. I have provided along with my
docketing statement a copy of a consultation report from my thoracic
specialist at McKay Dee Hospital in Ogden, which speaks to the contrary. I
was diagnosed with my bone condition in September of 2007, only a surgery
would have fully corrected my condition, and I had no opportunity to take
the necessary, paid leave from work until after my probationary period
ended in July. I was afforded neither an accommodation nor the time
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necessary to resolve my healthcare needs. In addition, no time was granted
for me to meet with my primary-care physician to determine if anything
could be done to alleviate my symptoms while awaiting surgery. It wasn't
until May that I was even able to see him due to his b^sy work schedule.

Conclusion:
I am requesting that the Appeals Court reinstate my unemployment benefits
based on the fact that staying at the health department would have been an
undue burden for me without having a proper accommodation for my health
needs or without at least being given a chance to meet with my physician to
possibly alleviate my symptoms while awaiting surgery. As noted, running
the groups for 2 weeks confirmed my suspicion that I lacked the stamina to
do so. However, those 2 weeks were an insufficient timeframe in which to
schedule and maintain an appointment with my local physician and to get
underway with a treatment program of any kind, as the appeals board
suggested I should have been able to do.

No addendum is required.

Mary L. Sfeager
Seager
Petitioner

/
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